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Do global current account imbalances still matter in a world of deep international financial markets
where gross two-way financial flows often dwarf the net flows measured in the current account? Contrary
to a complete markets or “consenting adults” view of the world, large current account imbalances,
while very possibly warranted by fundamentals and welcome, can also signal elevated macroeconomic
and financial stresses, as was arguably the case in the mid-2000s. Furthermore, the increasingly big
valuation changes in countries’ net international investment positions, while potentially important
in risk allocation, cannot be relied upon systematically to offset the changes in national wealth implied
by the current account. The same factors that dictate careful attention to global imbalances also imply,
however, that data on gross international financial flows and positions are central to any assessment
of financial stability risks. The balance sheet mismatches of leveraged entities provide the most direct
indicators of potential instability, much more so than do global imbalances, though the imbalances
may well be a symptom that deeper financial threats are gathering.
Maurice Obstfeld
Department of Economics
University of California, Berkeley




Are discrepancies between national exports and imports ever a legitimate cause for 
government concern or intervention?  The question is as old as economic theory itself.  
Sixteenth-century English writers deplored the drainage of precious metals implied by 
deficits in foreign trade; as a result, the term “balance of trade” had entered into public 
discourse by the early seventeenth century.
1 David Hume’s account in 1752 of the price-
specie-flow mechanism, arguably the greatest set piece of classical monetary economics, 
vanquished for many years the mercantilist position that the perpetual accumulation of 
external wealth was both desirable and feasible. More than 250 years later, however, the 
foreign trade imbalances of national units – including even some that share common 
currencies – still figure prominently in debates over economic policy.  
  We should not be surprised. Even in an ideal world free of economic frictions, 
foreign demand and supply conditions are constraints on the maximal welfare attainable 
by the national unit. Its government therefore faces incentives to manipulate those 
constraints. In simple neoclassical theory all countries gain from free trade, including 
balanced trade, but in a real world permeated with economic and political distortions, a 
government’s perceived short-run advantage may be enhanced by policies that enlarge 
the trade surplus. Such policies necessarily affect trading partners because a bigger 
surplus for one country requires correspondingly smaller ones for all the others. Of 
course, it is also quite common that government policies lead to larger deficits, and in 
theory, different distortions could result in absolute current account imbalances that are 
too small, rather than too big, compared to an efficient benchmark. 
                                                           
1 See Price (1905). On the evolving interpretation of the phrase, and its relation to what we now call the 
current account, see Fetter  (1935).   2
Policies motivated by purely national advantage may well be collectively 
counterproductive if widely undertaken, which is why countries have sought to 
coordinate their trade and sometimes macroeconomic and financial policies. Economic 
frictions in goods markets and financial markets potentially increase the gains from 
policy cooperation, and they also can raise each country’s vulnerability to a range of 
internal and external shocks, as well as the strength of spillover effects abroad. While 
profitable to the private parties involved, some transactions between sovereign 
jurisdictions may exacerbate systemic vulnerabilities, and therefore are legitimate targets 
for policymakers’ attention. 
  The recent global crisis and its troubled sequel have brought these possibilities 
into sharp relief. Some but not all observers link the origin of the crisis to the rapid 
increase in economic globalization that preceded it, especially financial globalization. 
Nearly everyone, however, acknowledges that stronger financial and trade linkages 
helped propagate the crisis across borders.  
Much contentious debate harks back to the debates of Hume’s day by focusing on 
the current account balance as a potential conduit for international shock transmission, or 
as a carrier of financial vulnerability. A country’s current account is the difference 
between its saving and its domestic investment, or, equivalently, between its exports of 
goods and services (including income receipts on assets held abroad) and its imports.
2 
The circumstantial evidence is that the crisis was preceded by historically large “global 
imbalances” in current accounts, including big deficits run by a number of industrial 
                                                           
2 This formula corresponds to Meade’s (1951, p. 7) definition of the “balance of trade.” Strictly speaking, 
any balance of unrequited transfers is added to this trade balance to compute the current account balance. 
The current account gets its name from its coverage of “current” as opposed to “capital” transactions. Its 
position today in United States balance of payments statistics owes to the recommendations of the Review   3
economies that subsequently came to grief (including the United States). Figure 1 shows 
how the dispersion of global current account imbalances grew from the late 1990s 
through 2006, the year before the onset of the global crisis. 
But is concern about current account imbalances still warranted in the twenty-first 
century? Policymakers certainly seem to think that it is.  In 2006 the International 
Monetary Fund launched a multilateral consultative process that aimed to promote an 
orderly unwinding of large global imbalances. Similar issues have remained on the 
agenda of the Group of Twenty countries in the wake of the crisis. And in July 2010 the 
European Commission proposed an enhanced surveillance framework for EU members 
based on a broad range of indicators of potential macroeconomic imbalances, including 
current accounts.
3 The latter, unlike the public finances and inflation, figured nowhere in 
the Maastricht Treaty’s macroeconomic criteria for entry into the single European 
currency.  
What these high-level discussions seem to miss when they focus on current-
account imbalances is the spectacular evolution and integration of international financial 
markets over the past quarter century. Global imbalances are financed by complex 
multilateral patterns of gross financial flows, flows that are typically much larger than the 
current account gaps themselves. These financing patterns raise the question of whether 
the generally much smaller net current account balance matters much any more, and, if 
so, when and how. They also draw attention to the implications for asset prices and 
financial stability of the much larger gross flows, which are intermediated through the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Committee for Balance of Payments Statistics (1965), a group that also stressed the linkage of the concept 
to the national income and product accounts, as noted by Cooper (1966). 
3 See  European Economy News, October 2010, available online at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/een/019/article_88106_en.htm   4
financial markets of current account deficit and surplus countries alike. Some economists 
suggest that the current account is much less important nowadays than policymakers’ 
continuing attention to global imbalances would suggest. 
  Ironically, the two main lines of attack on the importance of the current account 
balance both rely on the increasing fluidity and depth of global financial markets, but 
they take diametrically opposite views of those markets.  To highlight the contrast, I state 
both arguments in their most extreme forms.  
The first argument assumes that countries have extensively diversified their 
idiosyncratic risks in sophisticated, well-functioning markets for contingent securities. In 
this world of virtually complete Arrow-Debreu asset markets, extensive global financial 
markets allow countries to pool their risks to the maximum feasible extent. Except when 
current account imbalances arise because of excessive government deficits, they 
represent optimizing household and firm decisions that support intertemporally efficient 
resource allocations and thus do not raise policy concerns.  
The second argument against the continuing relevance of the current account is 
less optimistic (to say the least). It is based on the view that risk sharing is inherently 
imperfect and that high volumes of international financial activity often reflect skewed 
incentives and expectations, tax avoidance or evasion, regulatory arbitrage, implicit 
government guarantees, and other distortions. On this view, financial market 
imperfections can reinforce each other so as to magnify systematic risks, which 
themselves are endogenous to the financial system. This second argument maintains that 
the stability impact of current account balances per se is small compared to that of the 
gross asset flows that ultimately finance international financial transactions. The bulk of   5
these flows spread interconnected counterparty risks that become acute in a crisis. In any 
case, the impact of net current account flows on a country’s net external wealth are 
dwarfed by capital gains and losses on increasing gross foreign asset and liability 
positions. 
  This lecture presents the case that even in today’s world of deep and globalized 
financial markets, the national current account balance remains a policy-relevant variable 
on both financial and macroeconomic grounds. Nonetheless, I will also argue that while 
policymakers must continue to monitor global current accounts, such attention is far from 
sufficient to ensure global financial stability. In line with the second view of current 
accounts sketched above, large gross financial flows entail potential stability risks that 
may be only distantly related, if related at all, to the global configuration of saving-
investment discrepancies. Adequate surveillance requires not only enhanced information 
on the nature, size, and direction of gross global financial trades, but better understanding 
of how those flows fit together with economic developments (including current account 
balances) in the world’s economies, both rich and poor. 
 
I. International Flows, Stocks, and Budget Constraints 
 
A basic fact about financial globalization since the early 1990s is that gross 
financial flows and gross stocks of foreign assets and liabilities have grown rapidly and 
for some countries, explosively. The evolution of gross flows is illustrated by the 
experience of the United States, which is a relatively closed economy compared to many 
others. The two panels of Figure 2 show the gross payments flows underlying the U.S.   6
current account balance, as well as those that have financed it. Panel (a) shows U.S. 
residents’ net purchases of foreign assets and (with a negative sign) foreign residents’ net 
purchases of U.S. assets. The algebraic sum of the two series in panel (a) is the net 
increase in U.S. foreign assets less the net increase in U.S. foreign liabilities. It equals the 
U.S. current account balance (plus the usually small capital account balance) in principle 
but not in practice, because of inevitable errors and omissions in the data.
4 Panel (b) of 
figure 2 shows U.S. exports and imports, together with gross investment income flows 
and net transfers. The algebraic sum of the five series shown in the lower panel yields the 
current account balance.  
In the mid-1970s, gross financial flows were much smaller than trade flows, but 
the former have grown over time and on average now are of comparable magnitude to 
trade flows. Of course, international flows of investment income have grown over time as 
gross foreign asset and liability stocks positions have grown. Figure 3 illustrates the 
explosive growth of those stocks for a selection of countries and country groups, using 
the position data assembled by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), and extended by the 
authors through 2010. Let A denote the economy’s gross foreign assets and L its gross 
foreign liabilities (both aggregates encompassing the domestic public as well as private 
sectors). The data in Figure 3 represent the average of external assets and liabilities, 
divided by GDP, or (A + L)/2GDP; for country groups I show the GDP-weighted 
average. 
The data indicate a rapid buildup in external positions, especially since the late 
1990s, in the wealthier countries. On this measure, Japan’s “financial openness” merely 
                                                           
 
4 The capital account is reserved for a relatively small class of items, such as debt forgiveness.   7
doubles since the late 1990s, while that of the U.S. triples, to about 1.5 times GDP. The 
euro zone’s is higher still, whereas for the countries of Newly Industrialized Asia (Hong 
Kong, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan), average openness is about 3 times GDP. Most striking 
are the very high numbers for rich European financial hubs such as the Netherlands, 
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. For emerging markets (represented here by the 
BRIC countries), financial openness remains much lower, and its growth rate so far is 
more moderate. 
What is the relation between the international flows of asset sales and purchases 
reported in balance of payments data and the stocks of foreign assets and liabilities? The 
conventions governing the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) dictate that 
the correspondence is imperfect, and increasingly so as financial globalization has 
proceeded. Let CA denote the current account surplus, equal (apart from the generally 
insignificant capital account balance) to domestic residents’ net purchases of foreign 
assets less foreign residents’ net purchases of domestic assets (the level of financial flows 
abroad). Let KGA and KGL be changes in the nominal market values of foreign assets and 
liabilities (capital gains terms due to exchange rate and other asset price movements). 
Then the overall change in the net international investment position or NIIP, defined as A 
− L, is equal to the current account plus net capital gains on the NIIP: 
 
Notice that the net capital gain KGA − KGL is part of income as commonly 
conceptualized by economists, but not as measured in the national accounts, just as other 
capital gains on wealth do not enter into the NIPA concepts of income or saving. Because 
the U.S. external portfolio is long foreign currencies and short U.S. dollars, long foreign 
.( 1 ) AL A L CA KG KG −= + −     ………………………………  8
equities and short U.S. debt, weakness in the dollar or strength in world equity markets 
tends to flatter the NIIP of the United States. But the gains will not be recorded in the 
U.S. national income accounts or current account balance. 
  Alongside the expanding volume of financial flows shown in Figure 1, an 
expanding amplitude of valuation changes on external assets and liabilities has also 
driven the dynamics of those stocks. The panels of Figure 4 illustrate the trends since the 
early 1970s for six selected countries. The plots display both current account balances 
(flow changes) and the changes in national NIIPs that are not attributable to current 
account flows (both expressed as percentages of GDP). The increasing volatility trend in 
the non-flow changes is exactly what one expects given the steadily expanding ratios to 
GDP of gross assets and liabilities, although time variation in the variance of asset-price 
shocks also plays a role.
5 
  The key economic significance of the NIIP is that at any point in time, it limits the 
present value of a country’s future net export deficits (not including international 
investment income). This national constraint, which governs a country’s feasible 
transactions with foreigners, can be viewed as an implication derived from three more 
basic relationships.   
The household budget constraint, written in domestic nominal terms, is 
                                                           
5 For some earlier references on the role of valuation changes, see Obstfeld (2004). As is discussed further 
below, it is not in general correct to attribute the non-flow change in the NIIP entirely to asset-price 
movements that are not captured in national income statistics. The procedures generally followed by 
national statistical agencies do not always enforce consistency between the NIIP numbers (which can be 
subject to large periodic revisions) and the current account numbers, so some part of the non-flow change is 
likely to reflect measurement error.   9
 
where V denotes the nominal market value of the claims to capital resident in the home 
economy, D the domestic government’s net outstanding debt in nominal terms 
(accounting for foreign exchange reserve assets), Ω(s)/Ω(t) is the stochastic discount 
factor for money, C is nominal consumption, T is nominal tax payments, and W is 
nominal wage income of resident workers.
6 The government’s budget constraint is  
 
where G is nominal government consumption. Finally, we have the following equilibrium 
relation between V and the present value of future profits Y − W − I generated by 
domestic capital,  
 
where Y is nominal GDP and I is nominal spending on investment.
7 Combining these 
three, we conclude that the NIIP limits the present value of future net export deficits: 
                                                           
6 In this and the subsequent government budget constraint I ignore the role of money and seigniorage. 
Seigniorage can be significant – for example the Federal Reserves recent operating profits – but I leave it 
aside because it will enter the national intertemporal budget constraint [equation (5) below] only when 
foreign residents are willing to hold significant quantities of a country’s cash. This is the case mostly for 
currencies that play a big role in underground transactions, notably the U.S. dollar, which is dominant in 
global black markets as it is in the legitimate sphere.  
7 The fiscal theory of the price level interprets the government budget constraint, in analogy with the capital 
valuation equation, as an equilibrium condition. 
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  Calculated at world prices, this derived national solvency constraint bites 
regardless of the exchange-rate regime. It covers the consolidated public and private 
sectors. For example, A comprises foreign exchange reserves that the government 
acquires through currency-market interventions, just as L includes domestic sovereign 
debt held by foreigners. The constraint shows what is needed for a current account deficit 
to be sustainable. If deficits are driving the NIIP downward, then in the absence of 
windfall capital gains on national foreign positions, expenditure has to fall or output to 
rise in order that the private and public sectors both remain solvent. If sufficient 
adjustments in those directions are not politically or technologically feasible, then further 
borrowing is simply not sustainable, in the sense that it will ultimately lead to a solvency 
crisis somewhere in the economy. 
The role of the NIIP as a limit on the present value of net export surpluses also 
shows that its sign, positive or negative determines how a general rise in global rates of 
return will impact domestic welfare. When A − L > 0, a rise in global rates of return 
generally makes room for larger future net export deficits. When A − L < 0, future net 
export surpluses generally must be increased when global rates of return rise in order to 
service the negative NIIP.  
The reality of financial globalization requires care in interpreting the national 
implications of measured gross positions, however. Several economies host foreign 
headquartered financial institutions that have substantial balance sheets. Ireland is a 
leading example. But balance of payments data are based on a residence rather than a 
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nationality principle, so potentially large fractions of gross external assets and liabilities 
(and the corresponding net positions) may belong to foreign nationals, and be only 
tangentially relevant to domestic nationals’ welfare. Furthermore, the national 
government may not find it necessary or desirable to intervene in support of resident 
institutions of foreign nationality that encounter financial problems. Nonetheless, in most 
cases the NIIP will still offer a reasonably good indicator of national consumption 
possibilities.  
 
II. Arguments for Neglecting Current Account  
 
 
The current account is one component of the overall change in the NIIP, and as such, its 
direction and absolute size imply changes in the economy’s overall consumption and 
investment opportunities, other things equal. Furthermore, because an opposite balance 
elsewhere in the world economy must match a given country’s balance, national current 
account developments necessarily imply opposite adjustments abroad. Several lines of 
argument contend that current account imbalances are essentially self-correcting à la 
Hume, or are of second-order policy importance compared to other aspects of 
international financial flows. 
 
  




In economic models with complete international asset markets, the scope for current 
account imbalances is likely to be much reduced, while potential negative interactions 
between international asset flows and financial market imperfections are absent. In a   12
canonical endowment economy with international borrowing and lending only, a country 
experiencing a temporary fall in output will borrow abroad to smooth its consumption, 
thereby running a temporary current account deficit. But with complete markets the 
adjustment process is entirely different.  
Consider, for example, the famous two-country endowment model of Lucas (1982). 
In that (ex ante symmetric) model, two countries swap exactly half the claims on their 
stochastic endowments, so that residents of both end up holding identical perfectly 
pooled portfolios. In that case, people share the consequences of any endowment shock, 
and since these shocks create no ex post wealth asymmetry between the countries, there 
is no ex post international asset trade either. 
  Complete market models with investment can result in current account deficits or 
surpluses, but they are likely to be smaller than in the incomplete market case, sometimes 
much smaller. For example, Coeurdacier, Kollmann, and Martin (2010) analyze a model 
with equity claims and real consols, an asset structure sufficient to reproduce complete 
markets up to a first-order approximation in a model with two shocks, shocks to 
productivity and to investment efficiency. In that model (again up to a first-order 
approximation), optimal portfolio behavior implies a zero current account as bond flows 
always offset equity flows. Other complete-markets models with investment may, 
however, imply nonzero current accounts. For example, when new firms are born in a 
country, equity shares in them must be distributed to foreign investors via a net financial 
inflow, or current account deficit.   13
  Clearly such scenarios, with or without investment, provide no basis for 
efficiency-enhancing policy intervention. On the other hand, empirical support for the 
complete-markets hypothesis is, to put it charitably, weak. 
 
 




An alternative case for neglect holds that optimizing, forward-looking households and 
firms – of the type that Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), for example, model – will generate 
current account balances consistent with efficient resource allocation, provided the 
public-sector deficit is not excessive.  Such imbalances can be expected to adjust toward 
moderate levels over time, and in an orderly fashion, as firms exhaust the most 
productive investment projects and as households shrink spending consistent with 
declining wealth. This natural adjustment process echoes Hume’s vision of inherently 
self-limiting trade imbalances, although it is more complex. In general, proponents of this 
vision focus on the possibility of excessive deficits, which are most likely to be at risk of 
abrupt reversal. 
  The argument that profit-maximizing firms and utility-maximizing households, 
unlike the government, are unlikely to over-borrow has been advanced in many cases of 
large current account deficits. Chile in the early 1980s is a classic case in which a huge 
current account deficit (peaking at 14.5 percent of GDP in 1981) was justified by Chilean 
officials as reflecting “exclusively the saving/investment gap of the private sector” and 
“by definition self-adjusting….”
8 As famously chronicled by Díaz-Alejandro (1985), the 
                                                           
8 Boughton (2001, p. 349n).  Also see the discussion by Edwards (2002, p. 28).   14
episode ended in a devastating crash, with Chile’s government massively socializing 
private-sector debts.  
  Despite this and similar experiences in the developing world, perhaps the best-
known enunciation of the case for neglect was offered subsequently by British Chancellor 
of the Exchequer Nigel Lawson. At the 1988 annual meetings of the IMF and World 
Bank, as the U.K. current account deficit was rising from below 1 percent of GDP in 
1986 to just under 5 percent in 1989, Lawson asserted that an external deficit originating 
in private-sector behavior should be of no concern.  This view became knows as the 
“Lawson Doctrine.”
 9 Around the same time a similar doctrine, knows as the Pitchford 
Thesis (after Pitchford 1989) or the “consenting adults” view of the current account, 
became influential in Australia, a country that has run oftentimes large deficits in every 
year since 1974 without encountering a serious crisis.
10 
  One can appreciate the intellectual underpinnings of the Lawson Doctrine by 
reviewing equations (2) – (4) above and their relationship to equation (5), the national 
solvency constraint. For the purpose of this discussion I define P as the home price level 
and rewrite the government budget constraint (3) in real terms as 
 
Suppose that the government is expected to follow policies consistent with market 
valuation of its debt at par, given the price-level path desired by the central bank. 
                                                           
9 IMF (1988, pp. 78-85). Lord Lawson’s current views are summarized in his inaugural Adam Smith 
Lecture, given at Pembroke College, Cambridge in November 2010; see Lawson (2011). 
10 An early advocate of the “consenting adults” view was W. Max Corden. For a discussion of the 
Australian debate over the significance of the external deficit, see Belkar, Cockerell, and Kent (2007), who 
also advance possible reasons for Australia’s  positive experience of dependence on foreign capital. A 
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Suppose further that the aggregate of households is expected to respect equation (2), 
given that the value of their equity assets is rationally assessed according to (4). Then the 
national intertemporal constraint (5) holds automatically. It is a derivative concept, 
however, because while equations (2)-(4) refer to basic economic units, equation (5) 
refers to the geographical unit within which those economic units reside. The Lawson 
Doctrine admits that the government may manage its affairs badly – the result being 
undesired inflation, a haircut on government debt, or both – but it does not recognize the 
private sector as a source of trouble. Thus, if the government finances are well managed, 
there is no further need to worry about the country’s external deficits or debts. 
  A key problem with the Lawson argument is that the dividing line between public 
and private debts becomes hazy precisely in crisis situations. This problem, once thought 
to apply most starkly to developing countries, is now manifestly a major issue for rich 
countries as well. And when the government intervenes, it does so to achieve a national 
objective, and with national effects.  
Government improvidence may adversely affect private-sector budget constraints, 
of course, as when domestic holders of government debt take losses. But, conversely, 
private sector difficulties may adversely affect the government’s budget, as when the 
liabilities of failing banks receive public guarantees. (And of course, the expectation of 
such guarantees undermines the efficient functioning of markets.) Particularly in systemic 
crises, the budget constraints of the private and public sectors are inescapably 
intertwined, so that the national unit effectively does become an economic unit itself. In 
extreme cases, the government might even have to erect barriers between domestic and 
foreign financial markets.  It is the possibility that such events could occur, and the   16
resulting market expectations, that make national current account deficits and external 
positions relevant. Again, one must add a caveat concerning economies that extensively 
host foreign-owned financial institutions. As noted above, their assets and liabilities may 
have little connection with domestic nationals and a foreign government may be their 
primary recourse for financial support in periods of financial stress. 
  Some claimed in the past that, thanks to the common currency issued by a system-
wide central bank, national current accounts would no longer matter in the euro zone. But 
the continuing fiscal and regulatory responsibilities of national euro zone governments to 
maintain national financial stability explain why member countries’ individual external 
accounts remain a cause for concern. In particular, the absence of system-wide euro zone 
fiscal and regulatory authorities to oversee a highly integrated bond market has proved to 
be a huge liability, and has contributed to market segmentation in the crisis – even before 
the threat that some countries could depart the common currency. The contrast with the 
fiscal and regulatory arrangements in currency unions such as the United States – where 
sub-unit current account data are not even collected – could not be starker.  
  Aside from these important considerations relating to the role of governments, 
any number of factors, not all government imposed, may distort the behavior of firms and 
households, leading to current account deficits that are too large to be sustained. Suppose 
markets overestimate the value of equities. If foreigners largely hold these, it is they who 
will take the loss when the crash comes. In the case of home bias in equity holdings, 
however, the result is a fall in domestic wealth and consumption, including imports. 
  
   17
C.  The Case for Focusing on Gross Flows and Positions 
 
As I have noted, gross flows two-way financial flows now eclipse the net flows measured 
by the current account. Gross foreign asset and liability positions likewise have grown 
rapidly. But aren’t these gross quantities the ones policymakers should worry about? A 
country with a gross short-term debt position may be vulnerable to a run, just as banks 
are. And even if the country as a whole holds a large net foreign asset stock, it does not 
follow that the particular agents with short-term foreign liabilities hold enough liquid 
assets to pay them off should lenders refuse to renew their credits. A focus on net 
positions does not recognize that my fellow citizens’ assets are not available to pay off 
my debts – unless the government steps in, which generally happens only after a crisis 
has occurred. It is thus gross exposures that would seem to carry the risks of financial 
instability – of a balance-sheet crisis – regardless of whether the country has a current 
account deficit or surplus, or is a net international creditor or debtor. Financial actors 
engage in maturity and liquidity transformation within different currencies, regardless of 
their home lender of last resort, and this opens the door to financial fragility.
11 
Furthermore, the portfolio shifts reflected in gross flows can have big effects on asset 
prices, even in the absence of current account imbalances. Johnson (2009), Borio and 
Disyatat (2011), and Shin (2012) present this view forcefully.
12  
  Another implication of expanding gross asset and liability positions, noted above, 
is the increasing role of asset-price changes – the capital gains terms in equation (1) – in 
                                                           
 
11 An early model of balance-sheet crises is Calvo (2000). 
12 In a world of complete asset markets, of course, gross asset flows are of no more concern than are net 
flows.   18
explaining the variance of the NIIP. If the NIIP can jump wildly because of valuation 
changes that swamp the current account’s effect, why put so much emphasis on the 
current account? Let me expand on these arguments in turn. 
  For the rich industrial countries, much of the expansion of gross external asset and 
liability stocks has necessarily taken the form of debt instruments. There is considerable 
trade in equity too, as in the Lucas (1982) model, but the fact of home bias in equity 
ownership remains (although it is declining over time). Furthermore there is only so 
much real capital to underlie equity claims. The extreme ratios of external asset stocks to 
GDP that some countries display are not feasible except on the basis of extensive two-
way trade in debt or debt-like instruments, including derivatives. 
  Figure 5 illustrates this fact for the United States’ external assets and liabilities. 
The figure documents the well-know fact (see Gourinchas and Rey 2007a) that the U.S., 
on balance, issues debt in order to hold equity. The prevalence of debt on the asset and 
liability sides is even more pronounced for the United Kingdom, as is shown in Figure 6. 
For the U.K. in 2010, debt assets amounted to about 3.5 time GDP and debt liabilities to 
about 4 times GDP. 
  The motivations for such huge two-way debt flows, many of which are 
international banking flows of short maturity, are only partially understood. There are 
several microeconomic rationales for a positive effect of debt contracts on incentives, and 
the availability of safe debt instruments is essential for market liquidity. But as 
Gourinchas (2001) emphasizes, while debt may sometimes enhance the efficiency of 
bilateral deals between individual agents, and even be essential to smooth market 
functioning, liquidity can evaporate quickly and upward spikes in counterparty risk are   19
highly destabilizing at the systemic, macro level. Unfortunately, also, tax shifting and 
regulatory arbitrage are certainly important motivations for two-way debt transactions. 
The pyramiding of debt claims between counterparties often carries financial stability 
risks for the countries involved, regardless of their current account positions. Short-term 
liabilities are subject to rollover risk, and liquidity problems easily can spread, 
threatening the solvency of a range of financial institutions. When the assets of one 
institution become impaired, those that have lent to it, or are suspected of having done so, 
can lose credit themselves. The resulting contagion can spread rapidly across national 
borders. Of course, this picture of globalized finance, while downplaying the importance 
of net financial flows, is very far from the one underlying the complete-markets or 
“consenting adults” view of the world! 
  The prevalence of debt or debt-like instruments in international finance is 
therefore potentially worrisome. Unlike equity, these instruments feature a predetermined 
contractual payment (perhaps contingent) that is subject to default. When many financial 
players are themselves leveraged, the phenomenon raises significant systemic dangers. 
For this reason, countries such as India have actively discouraged debt inflows while 
permitting inflows of portfolio equity and FDI. 
  Johnson's (2009, pp. 13-14) summary makes the case well: "Current account data 
are too partial (because of netting in the statistics) to give useful information on the 
associated financial flows. The netting embedded in current account data can be 
misleading because the assets acquired by some domestic residents are not necessarily 
available to meet the liabilities of other domestic residents and because the composition 
of claims acquired on the rest of the world, and hence their risk characteristics, may be   20
quite different from the composition of claims on the domestic economy acquired by 
foreign residents." For purposes of assessing vulnerability to financial crisis, there is no 
substitute for information on the composition of each individual institution's gross assets 
and gross liabilities.  Crises are crises precisely because of financial markets' inability to 
allocate liquidity where it is most needed, when it is most needed. 
  A prime example of how two-way financial flows helped lay the groundwork for 
the 2007-09 global crisis comes from the large position in AAA-rated United States 
asset-backed securities (ABS) taken by European banks, as documented by Johnson 
(2009), Bernanke et al. (2011), Borio and Disyatat (2011), Bertaut et al. (2011), and Shin 
(2012), among others. To summarize broadly, many banks invested in ABS, in many 
cases through special purpose conduits, funding their acquisitions of these dollar assets 
with wholesale dollars often borrowed from U.S. money-market funds. For the European 
banks, such transactions offered relatively high net returns as well as some relief from 
regulatory capital requirements.
13 For the money market funds, the transactions offered 
apparently high liquidity as well as favorable interest rates. The transactions were thus 
privately, if not always socially, profitable. Although extensive, this business received 
relatively little attention in policy circles compared with the flows of emerging markets’ 
excess savings into U.S. Treasury securities and agency obligations. But the flows from 
Europe played a key role in U.S. credit growth, including housing finance. Banking 
inflows to the U.S. originated in current-account deficit countries (the United Kingdom) 
and surplus countries (Germany, Switzerland) alike. Data from the Bank for International 
Settlements on bank holdings by nationality show that by 2007, non-U.S. banks (mostly 
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European but also Japanese) held more than $6 trillion in claims on the United States – 
compared to a total nominal U.S. GDP of about $14 trillion (Borio and Disyatat 2011). 
  A first observation is that the transactions just described simultaneously raise 
gross foreign debt assets and debt liabilities in both Europe and the U.S. The U.S. money 
market fund acquires a gross claim on a European bank, which acquires an equal-valued 
ABS issued in the U.S., a U.S. gross liability. The mirror image shows up on the 
European external balance sheet. 
  A second observation is that these transactions, although believed to be virtually 
risk-free when undertaken in the frothy environment of the mid-2000s, actually involved 
dangerous liquidity and currency mismatches that were unexpectedly exposed starting in 
August 2007. At several points, European banks faced difficulty rolling over the short-
term dollar credits that funded their holdings of suddenly toxic American ABS. For these 
banks, heavily reliant on wholesale funding, this amounted to a run on their dollar 
liabilities. Selling dollar assets to repay the loans would have forced the banks to book 
losses, while also contributing to fire-sale dynamics in U.S. financial markets. On the 
other hand, borrowing euros (say) from the ECB and selling them for spot dollars would 
have left the banks dangerously long dollars and short euros. Foreign exchange swap 
markets, which normally would have been used to cover that risk, were simultaneously 
dysfunctional. Some non-U.S. banks had access to Federal Reserve lending, and held 
eligible collateral, but many did not. The situation was stabilized thanks to the 
willingness of the Fed to provide dollars to the ECB, eventually in unlimited amounts.
14 
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Table 1    Correlations ρ(∆NIIP/GDP,CA/GDP) by Period and Country Group 
Country Group  1971-90  1991-2010 
High-income 0.61  0.26 
Emerging 0.54  0.46 
Developing 0.46  0.34 
 
A third and last observation is that these tensions, like many others in financial 
markets in recent years, were felt by banks in current-account surplus and deficit  
countries alike simply because the banks’ intrinsic vulnerability originated in the gross 
positions on their balance sheets.  
  Let me turn next to the second reason suggested above for de-emphasizing the 
current account balance. This perspective admits the importance of the NIIP, but points to 
equation (1) and argues that the current account is an increasingly minor component of 
the overall change in the NIIP, which from year to year can easily offset the current 
account entirely.  
Table 1 illustrates the increasingly loose relationship between current accounts 
and changes in the NIIP. The table uses the Lane and Milesi-Ferretti data to compute the 
simple average correlation coefficients ρ(∆NIIP/GDP,CA/GDP) over two periods, 1971-
1990 and the later period of more intense financial globalization, 1991-2010.
15 For all 
country groups the correlation coefficient drops between the two periods, but the change 
                                                                                                                                                                             
14 On the ad hoc central bank swap network initiated in December 2007, see, for example, McGuire and 
von Peter (2009) and Goldberg, Kennedy, and Miu (2011). Fed support was renewed and remains in place 
as a result of the European sovereign debt crisis. 
15 Because of insufficient data availability, over the first subperiod the high-income sample is 20 countries, 
the emerging sample 56 countries, and the developing sample 81 countries. The respective sample sizes for   23
is most striking, naturally, for the high-income countries, which have generated the 
largest gross foreign asset and liability positions.  
In the case of the United States, the correlation coefficient drops from 0.83 before 
1991 to only 0.13 afterward. Figure 8 plots both the cumulated current account balance 
data and the measured NIIP for the United States, both relative to GDP (taking the 1970 
NIIP as an initial benchmark for the cumulated current account series). On face value, 
these data seem to indicate that, for a lengthy period after 2002, the U.S. was apparently 
able to borrow historically large amounts without any deterioration in its NIIP.  
Because capital gains and losses on net international positions result in such large 
wealth transfers between countries, it is natural to ask whether these play any positive 
risk sharing role. Gourinchas, Rey, and Govillot (2010) suggest that the U.S. may 
effectively provide global crisis insurance to the world, in return for a low foreign 
borrowing rate. The dollar has been a safe haven currency, appreciating in the face of 
negative global shocks. This fact and the fact of declines in world stock markets during 
crises result in outward wealth transfers from the U.S. during periods of global stress. 
The patterns of such transfers across countries deserve further study, as does the general 




                                                                                                                                                                             
the second subperiod are 21, 56, and 99. The correlations are relatively low for emerging and developing 
countries over the first subperiod due to both poor data and to episodes of external debt restructuring. 
16 Simple representative-agent models of efficient international risk sharing with plausible relative risk 
aversion imply that U.S. consumption spending should rise relative to foreign consumption spending in 
states of nature where the dollar appreciates in real terms. In contrast, the structure of the U.S. external 
portfolio dictates that (unexpected) dollar appreciation transfers wealth to foreigners from the U.S.; see 
Obstfeld (2007). That pattern is consistent with efficient aggregate risk sharing (as is the Gourinchas-Rey-
Govillot idea) if, even after the international wealth transfer, U.S. spending is high relative to foreign   24
III. So Why Worry about Current Account Balances? 
 
The arguments that current account deficits are self-correcting, that huge cross-border 
financial flows promote efficient risk sharing, and that private-sector self interest leads to 
socially efficient allocations absent government-imposed distortions all look increasingly 
implausible in light of recent experience.
17 Even if one rejects those doctrines, however, 
one might still argue that the current account balance itself is of little significance, 
especially for the advanced economies that reside increasingly in an ocean of two-way 
financial flows and routinely experience large capital gains and losses on their gross 
international assets and liabilities. 
  So why continue to worry about the current account? To my mind, one can group 
the answers under three main categories: the current account as a symptom of related 
problems; the macro implications, both at home and abroad, of significant changes in 
current account imbalances; and the likelihood that, over the long run, the current account 
actually does do a reasonable job of tracking the NIIP.
18 
Before proceeding, I have to emphasize that just as the “consenting adults” 
framework claims, some current account imbalances, even very large ones, can be 
justified in terms of economic fundamentals and do not pose threats either to the national 
or international economy. Such imbalances need not be a symptom of economic 
distortions elsewhere in the economy, but instead reflect reasonably forward-looking 
decisions of households and firms, based on realistic expectations of the future. Not all 
                                                                                                                                                                             
spending in states of the world where the dollar is relatively strong. But this pattern is not consistent with 
the data, as a large literature in international macroeconomics documents. 
17 Which is not to say that government-related distortions such as “too big to fail” guarantees are 
unimportant – just that they are not the exclusive source of inefficiencies.   25
fall into this category, however, and the facts of the case are typically amenable to 
different interpretations – witness the debate over the global imbalances of the mid-
2000s, notably the U.S. deficit, as summarized by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2010). It is 
precisely the uncertainty whether a given imbalance is benign that underlies 
policymakers’ stance of continuing concern.  
  
A. Large Current Account Imbalance as a Symptom 
 
Numerous crises have been preceded by large current account deficits – Chile in 
1981, Finland in 1991, Mexico in 1994, Thailand in 1997, the United States in 2007, 
Iceland in 2008, and Greece in 2010, to name just a few. But temporal priority does not 
establish causality, and the empirical literature of the last two decades has not established 
a robust predictive ability of the current account for subsequent financial crises 
(especially where the richer economies are concerned). There are cases in which even 
large current account deficits have not led to crises, as noted above, and furthermore, 
several notable financial crises were not preceded by big deficits, including some of the 
banking crises in industrial countries during 2007-09 (for example, Germany and 
Switzerland).  
Frankel and Rose (1996), in a pioneering study, argued that large external deficits 
did not significantly raise the odds of a subsequent currency crisis in emerging markets, 
whereas Edwards (2002) argued that their result was somewhat sensitive to the definition 
of “crisis” and the region being studied. In a recent survey, Frankel and Saravelos (2010) 
                                                                                                                                                                             
18 For a complementary discussion, see Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti (2011). 
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conclude that the current account has some predictive power for currency crashes but less 
so than other indicators, such as international reserves and real exchange rates. 
Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012) distinguish among currency, banking, and default crises 
and find that while larger current account deficits often appear to proceed past crises, the 
current account generally does not play a statistically significant role in helping to predict 
various types crises. On the other hand, Catão and Milesi-Ferretti (2011) study a sample 
including advanced as well as developing economies over 1970-2010 and find that bigger 
current account deficits and bigger net external debt liabilities both raise the probability 
of debt crises, defined to include large disbursements from multilateral support programs 
as well as external default. So the evidence is somewhat mixed. 
A growing body of evidence, however, including the paper by Gourinchas and 
Obstfeld (2012) but also including Borio and Lowe (2002), Mendoza and Terrones 
(2008), Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor (2011), Schularick, and Taylor (2012), and many 
others, does indicate that rapid increases in domestic credit plays an economically and 
statistically significant role in predicting subsequent crises. Gourinchas and Obstfeld 
attribute the relative resilience of many emerging markets in the 2007-09 crisis in part to 
their avoidance of credit booms in the preceding years, and show that this was not the 
case in Central and Eastern Europe, where the effects of the crisis were especially harsh.  
The ability to borrow abroad generally will allow a country to borrow at lower 
interest rates, and with less pressure on the exchange rate and therefore on inflation, than 
if it was financially closed. So it is natural to suspect some systematic relationship among 
current account deficits, domestic credit growth, and financial crises. In reality the 
relationship seems to be complex. As Hume and Sentance (2009) point out, several large   27
emerging markets have experienced credit booms without net inflows of capital. Japan’s 
epic boom-bust cycle starting in the late 1980s occurred despite a current account surplus 
(although the surplus did decline during the Japanese bubble period).  
Despite such counterexamples, there is evidence (stronger for emerging countries) 
that net inflows of private capital may help generate credit booms and, in the presence of 
potentially fragile financial systems, raise the probability of a crash. For example, Ostry 
et al. (2011, p. 21) study panel data for an emerging-market sample over 1995-2008, and 
(based on specific definitions of credit booms and crises, of course) they conclude, “one-
half of credit booms are associated with a capital inflow surge, and of those that ended in 
a crisis, about 60 percent are associated with an inflow surge.” Mendoza and Terrones 
(2008) find that most emerging-market crises involve domestic credit booms and that 
elevated financial inflows often precede credit booms. An IMF study of 19 advanced and 
28 emerging market economies over the years 1960-2010 concludes similarly that 
financial inflows help predict credit booms (IMF 2011, pp. 47-50). 
  Studies such as these do not directly address the link between credit booms and 
the current account because the net inflow of private capital and the current account 
deficit need not coincide: even a country with a current account surplus may experience a 
net inflow of private capital if it is accumulating a sufficient volume of foreign exchange 
reserves. Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor (2011, p. 372) examine the question more 
directly, utilizing fourteen decades of data for a sample of advanced countries, and 
conclude that “The current account deteriorates in the run-up to normal crises, but the 
evidence is inconclusive in global crises, possibly because both surplus and deficit 
countries get embroiled in the crisis.” Reinhart and Reinhart (2009) study a broad sample   28
of emerging and advanced economies, differentiating among different types of financial 
crisis. They argue that large current account deficits make emerging-market economies 
more crisis-prone, while the evidence for advanced economies is mixed. The general 
question merits further research. 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2010) argue that for the United States, the big current 
account deficit of the mid-2000s was not a cause of the crisis, but instead an endogenous 
response to domestic and external factors, including credit and housing booms, that 
indeed were unsustainable and that ended in tears.
19 Indeed, a global credit boom 
occurred in the years preceding the crisis, and it cannot be directly attributed to external 
developments such as higher saving by Asian emerging markets and oil producers. As 
Hume and Sentance (2009) observe, the net inflow of capital from emerging to advanced 
economies is quantitatively far less than the amount of domestic credit those economies 
generated in the run up to the global crisis. Empirically, bigger housing booms were 
associated with bigger current account deficits. And where current account deficits were 
large, they generally were a symptom of brewing financial instability. 
  External deficits may not be the true source of a problem – nor is the problem 
necessarily addressed most effectively by seeking directly to reduce the external deficit – 
but it is nonetheless prudent to be vigilant. Looking at the current predicament of the euro 
zone, it is easy to argue (unfortunately, with hindsight), that its members’ external 
imbalances after 1999 were symptomatic of unsustainable trends – Greece’s government 
deficit, housing and construction booms in Spain and Ireland, and excessive private 
                                                           
19 The United States’ ability to borrow large amounts abroad on favorable terms, however, facilitated the 
domestic asset boom. Otherwise, the dollar’s foreign exchange value would have been lower and domestic 
interest rates higher. 
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borrowing in Portugal, with finance provided in large measure by European banks 
(including banks in surplus countries) that now find themselves in trouble. A cautious 
interpretation of the track record, it seems to me, is that large, persistent unexplained 
deficits warrant careful policymaker scrutiny. 
This is not to say that large surpluses in current accounts may not also be 
symptomatic of financial and economic distortions. China’s high surplus, for example, is 
certainly linked to low levels of social insurance, to financial repression that keeps the 
return to savings low, and to a corporate governance framework that encourages 
excessive saving by firms.  
 
B. Macroeconomic  Implications 
 
Being highly correlated with net exports, the current account also plays a role as a key 
component of a country’s aggregate demand. Since current accounts throughout the 
world necessarily sum to zero in theory – which is to say that world saving must equal 
world investment  absent measurement problems – shifts in patterns of current accounts 
are also likely to be correlated with shifts in global real interest rates, especially at the 
longer maturities where monetary policies presumably have less influence. Such shifts 
also affect terms of trade and real exchange rates, with impacts on resource allocation 
throughout the world. Bernanke’s (2005) celebrated (if sometimes disputed) account of 
the “global saving glut” is a prime example of this implication of global imbalances. 
According to this view, bigger surpluses by emerging market countries such as China   30
pushed world real interest rates down, with repercussions in advanced-country asset and 
housing markets. 
  One obvious danger of running a large current account deficit is that in the 
aggregate, an excess of spending over income necessarily must be sustained by sales of 
foreign assets (privately owned or official reserves) or finance provided by foreigners. If 
foreigners suddenly become unwilling to provide that finance, and if only limited 
liquidity can be generated through domestic residents’ sales of their foreign assets, then 
the current account necessarily must adjust abruptly through a collapse in domestic 
demand. This is the “sudden stop” scenario discussed by Calvo and Reinhart (2000). It 
can imply abrupt and painful adjustments in relative prices and resource allocation, along 
with negative balance-sheet effects when foreign-currency liabilities are widespread. 
Current-account surplus countries have a much milder dependence on foreign 
financial inflows. The individuals in surplus countries who are borrowing abroad could in 
principle find domestic credit sources if foreign supply were cut off, all at an unchanged 
aggregate current account surplus. Thus a strike by foreign lenders, other things equal, 
does not necessarily force a current-account surplus country to increase its surplus.  
Nonetheless, an abrupt collapse of gross foreign inflows is likely in practice to 
have significant economic effects even on a surplus country, including an increase in the 
trade balance. A sharp global portfolio shift away from a surplus country’s assets requires 
adjustments in rates of return and the exchange rate. Domestic rates of return need to rise 
to divert domestic savings to domestic borrowers, while real currency depreciation 
reduces imports and spur exports. But the size of the resulting trade balance increase is 
perforce much smaller than the increase that a current-account deficit country must   31
generate in the face of a complete sudden stop. Accordingly, the degree of 
macroeconomic dislocation is much smaller for a surplus country as well. And naturally, 
the surplus country’s lower vulnerability to disappearing gross foreign inflows also 
makes it much less likely that those inflows do disappear. 
  For a deficit economy, the nature of aggregate gross asset and liability positions, 
and the distribution of different assets and liabilities among individuals, plainly affects 
the way a sudden stop scenario plays out. Initial portfolio positions can make the 
outcome less bad (if agents hold liquid foreign assets, or assets useful as collateral for 
foreign loans), or much worse (if agents have extensive short-term foreign liabilities). 
Figure 7 illustrates the example of the United States over the two quarters of 
intensive global deleveraging following the Lehman Brothers collapse in September 
2008. (Figure 1 shows annual data.) Gross capital inflows, which in previous years had 
been sufficient to more than cover even a 2006 net current account deficit of 6 percent of 
GDP, went into reverse, as foreigners liquidated $198.5 billion in U.S. assets.
20 In 
addition, the U.S. financed a current account shortfall of $231.1 billion (down sharply 
from the current account deficit of  $371.4 billion over the previous two quarters). Where 
did the total of nearly $430 billion in external finance come from? It came from U.S. 
sales of $428.4 billion of assets held abroad – a volume so big that the dollar actually 
appreciated sharply through March 2009. Had these resources not been available (as a 
result of past gross financial outflows from the U.S.), foreigners would have been able to 
liquidate fewer of their U.S. assets, the U.S. current account deficit would have been 
compressed further, and the dollar would have slumped in currency markets. Of course,   32
financial intermediation between U.S. resident individuals was disrupted during this 
period, making it more difficult for those with foreign liabilities but not assets to finance 
repayments. Hence the need for extensive intervention by central banks.
21 
For a country with few liquid foreign assets, but substantial short-term liabilities 
that foreigners refuse to roll over, a sudden stop in financial inflows opens up an external 
financing gap even larger than the current account deficit, leading to a sharp and much 
more painful adjustment. Emerging markets in the past were more likely to be in this 
category, though they have been accumulating higher volumes of gross private foreign 
assets these days, alongside copious international reserves. The results of such sudden 
stop episodes can be quite painful.
22 A current account deficit creates a basic 
vulnerability to a sudden stop in financial inflows, but as noted above, the nature of gross 
foreign asset and liability positions will be a critical determinant of the denouement. 
Gross currency, liquidity, and maturity exposures determine which actors will encounter 
financial stress, in turn stressing their creditors, their creditors’ creditors, and so on. 
Some argue that euro zone peripheral countries have been suffering a sudden stop 
of gross financial inflows during the currency union’s debt crisis, with finance for the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
20 These data, from the Bureau of Economic Analysis website (accessed December 2011), are not 
seasonally adjusted. Fortunately for my example, large errors and omissions in each of the two quarters I 
discuss cancel when flows over the two quarters are summed. 
21 It is useful to keep in mind that all of the flows being discussed are endogenous. Some foreign 
liquidations of U.S. assets were prompted by U.S. repayment demands on foreigners, and vice versa. 
22 Empirical studies suggest that the output and exchange rate effects of  current-account reversals differ 
across countries and need not always bring a sharp slowdown. See, for example, Milesi-Ferretti and Razin 
(2000), Edwards (2002), and Freund and Warnock (2007). For a theoretical model of a sudden stop leading 
to economic collapse, see Mendoza (2010). Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2011) argue that countries with initial 
current account deficits adjusted more sharply in the 2007-09 crisis, and in particular, that a key correlate of 
the extent of demand and output compression was the degree to which the deficit exceeded an empirical 
benchmark based on economic and demographic fundamentals. Recognizing the growing divergences 
between gross and net financial flows even for emerging economies, Forbes and Warnock (2011) develop a 
50-country database and analyze extreme financial capital movements over the 1980-2009 period.   33
current account and financial outflows coming from IMF and EU lending and the ECB.
23 
The euro zone peripherals have, however, also been able to draw down stocks of foreign 
assets. Furthermore, within the euro zone, a further source of finance (at least from euro 
zone partners) is cash, net cross-border flows of which have given rise to the much-
discussed net national positions within the TARGET payment system.
24 
A theoretical argument that current account deficits (as well as the surpluses of 
creditor countries) may generally be too large comes from considering the externalities 
that can arise when financial markets are incomplete (Korinek 2011). A sudden stop can 
lead to a currency depreciation that, in turn, raises the real value of foreign liabilities and 
thereby tightens financial constraints. Because individuals do not internalize this 
pecuniary externality, borrowers borrow too much and lenders lend too much, so there is 
a (global) welfare argument for reducing the size of external imbalances. 
  Creditors can impose a sharp reduction in the current account deficit, but the 
reduction also can arise from a fall in domestic demand, for example, due to household 
deleveraging or a collapse in investment. In either case, the resulting fall in aggregate 
demand is likely to have exchange rate implications, of the type modeled by Obstfeld and 
Rogoff (2007). An unusually (and possibly unsustainably) large current account deficit 
therefore will signal an empirical range of possible exchange-rate effects. However, a 
sustainable level of the current account, like that of the public deficit, is difficult to define 
in any objective way. Clearly some of the past euro zone current account imbalances 
have raised repayment issues, with Greece, for example, borrowing to fund high levels of 
government consumption, and Spain borrowing to finance investment in largely 
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nontraded goods such as housing, which cannot be used to pay off external creditors 
through net exports as demanded by constraint (5).
25  
  Within a monetary union, an internal constellation of large current account 
deficits driven by domestic spending can be especially problematic. Real currency 
appreciation emerges as a deficit opens up, depressing the domestic real interest rate and 
encouraging the deficit to grow even further. Eventually, however, the currency will have 
to depreciate in real terms -- beyond even its intial, pre-shock level -- to generate net 
exports sufficient to service a much high net external debt. (See Fagan and Gaspar 2007 
for a formal model.) But how is the needed real depreciation to take place when the 
nominal exchange rate cannot change? The process requires painful internal devaluation 
unless there is substantial domestic real growth or substantial foreign inflation. In other 
words, a national current account deficit can look like a major “asymmetric shock,” 
precisely the type of development that makes currency union a bad idea. The experience 
of the euro zone peripheral countries after 1999 illustrates the danger. 
  Any problems associated with a given country’s external imbalance may 
primarily hurt its home economy. But negative consequences from changes in one 
country’s current account can also spill over into the global system. Blanchard and 
Milesi-Ferretti (2011) emphasize the distinction between national and systemic 
repercussions. In the latter category, a crisis in one deficit country, sparked by a sudden 
stop in its own financial inflows, can spread through contagion effects (think of Mexico 
in 1994, Thailand in 1997, or the euro zone now). Another example is related to the inherent
asymmetry between the pressures on surplus countries to move toward external balance and 
                                                           
 
25 See the analyses of Giavazzi and Spaventa (2010) and Lane and Pels (2011).    35
the greater pressures facing deficit countries. If countries collectively target a pattern of 
global imbalances that sums to a positive number rather than zero, world output and 
employment will suffer, a possibility that has inspired recent calls for global policy 
coordination. Proponents of the “global saving glut” account of the 2007-09 crisis hold 
that bigger surpluses by China had adverse effects on richer countries’ current accounts 
and financial markets. 
Debate over “currency wars” between recession-mired rich countries and faster-
growing emerging markets highlight another possibility. As rich countries such as the 
U.S. seek export-led growth through loose monetary policies and currency depreciation, 
emerging markets face a tradeoff between losing export competitiveness if they allow 
their currencies to appreciate, and higher domestic inflation if they intervene to resist 
appreciation. For many, the tradeoff is harsher because of China’s reliance on capital 
controls to manage its own currency in the interest of export promotion. Over the longer 
term, these international conflicts threaten to spread protectionism, which is yet another 
reason to be wary of large and persistent global imbalances. 
  Sometimes it is argued that the governments of countries with current account 
surpluses – countries that do not depend on foreign economies for finance – are in a 
better position to sustain large public deficits and debts. Japan is held up as an example. 
If such a country adopted financial repression as in the historical episodes analyzed by 
Reinhart and Sbrancia (2011), perhaps retracting capital exports so as to mobilize 
national savings, then theory tells us that its real domestic interest rate would fall toward 
its autarky level. This possibility is not open to deficit countries. Even if the Lawson   36
Doctrine is false, perhaps its converse has some plausibility: government deficits and 
debt are less of a concern if the current account is in surplus. 
 
C.  The Current Account and the Dynamics of the NIIP 
 
Market assessments of solvency are to some degree subjective and an entity with liquid 
liabilities may be pushed into bankruptcy even if it would be solvent in other states of the 
world. Nonetheless, the NIIP is a key ingredient in the national solvency constraint, and a 
deteriorating NIIP could well be the trigger for a sudden stop. To the extent that the 
NIIP’s evolution is decoupled from the current account balance, however, the case for 
considering the latter to be a key policy variable is weakened. As observed above, recent 
data suggest a very loose relationship for the U.S. (recall Figure 8).  
  Is it plausible that such decoupling occurs more generally over the long term? As 
a lens on the issue I rewrite equation (1). Let lower-case versions of the symbols in 
equation (1) denote ratios to nominal GDP, let g be the growth rate of nominal GDP, and 
let the superscripts p and u refer, respectively, to predictable and unpredictable changes 
(based on lagged information). Then the evolution of the NIIP, expressed as a ratio to 
nominal GDP, is: 
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Comparing equations (6) and (7), we see that unpredictable capital gains cannot 
systematically drive the NIIP/GDP ratio and the cumulated current account c apart. Only 
predictable capital gains can do so. But the likelihood that these are substantial is slim.  
Devereux and Sutherland (2010) argue that it is difficult to generate large 
expected capital gains within a reasonably calibrated model based on individual portfolio 
choice. In the case of the U.S., Gourinchas and Rey (2007b) show empirically that a 
higher net export deficit predicts a relative return differential in favor of U.S. foreign 
assets over liabilities, operating in part through capital gains due to exchange-rate and 
other asset-price movements. These changes appear to play a significant long-term role in 
mitigating the effects of net export deficits on the U.S. NIIP. For other industrial 
countries, however, valuation changes appear much less important in the long-term 
external adjustment to trade imbalances, and for emerging markets these effects play no 
role at all (International Monetary Fund 2005, chapter 3).
26  
  A very important caveat about the U.S. case is that a sizable part of the 
discrepancy in Figure 8 between the NIIP and the cumulated current account probably 
results from inaccuracies in the data on financial flows across U.S. borders.
27 NIIP data 
for the U.S. are periodically updated based on surveys, yet the financial flow (and current 
                                                           
26 Again, this is not to deny that valuation effects may play a role in international risk sharing. The question 
whether the valuation changes in equation (6) are systematic or purely random is related to, but distinct 
from, the question whether the U.S. systematically earns more on its foreign assets than it pays on its 
foreign liabilities. The latter question concerns overall asset returns (including interest and dividend 
payments, which are included in the current account), not just the capital gains components of returns. 
(Overall returns are also the focus in the Gourinchas and Rey 2007b study.) Because U.S. foreign assets are 
more heavily allocated to equity than are U.S. foreign liabilities, as noted earlier, an equity risk premium 
should raise the relative return on the portfolio of U.S. foreign assets. However, it has also been conjectured 
that even within asset classes the U.S. pays out less on foreign liabilities than it earns on foreign assets. 
Curcuru, Thomas, and Warnock (2011) survey the evidence and conclude that there is a significant 
discrepancy in this direction only for direct investments. They attribute it in part to tax considerations.   38
account) data are revised only slightly in the light of new information. For the U.S., the 
trend of NIIP revisions has been upward, suggesting that existing data on financial flows 
might overstate net financial inflows into the U.S. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2009) 
contend that over the past 25 years, existing BEA data may overstate U.S. net external 
borrowing by up to 0.6 percent of GDP per year. 
  All countries face challenges, of course, in accurately measuring international 
transactions and positions. But the problems have generally received less intensive 
scrutiny outside the United States. It is nonetheless striking that in the admittedly 
imperfect data that are available to us, many major countries apart from the United States 
display a visible long-run coherence between NIIP ratios to GDP and ratios of cumulated 
current accounts to GDP. Figure 9 offers some examples. The biggest and most 
protracted divergence occurs in the case of safe-haven Switzerland (panel c), where the 
cumulated current account falls after 1970 and remains below the NIIP (all relative to 
GDP) until the early 2000s.  
If national risks are being shared efficiently, the valuation gains in Figure 9 may 
be arriving just when countries need them the most. Whether that is so is an open 
question for future research (as is the question how, precisely, “efficient risk sharing” 
would look in reality). It would not necessarily follow, however, that countries 
persistently running down their external positions through current account deficits are 
systematically rewarded with capital gains at foreigners’ expense. My take-home from 
Figure 9 is that net windfall gains on gross foreign assets and liabilities cannot be relied 
upon to offset the external wealth effects of the current account. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
27 See Curcuru, Dvorak, Warnock (2008), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2009), and Gohrband and Howell 






To my mind, a lesson of recent crises is that globalized financial markets present 
potential stability risks that we ignore at our peril. Contrary to a complete markets or 
“consenting adults” view of the world, current account imbalances, while very possibly 
warranted by fundamentals and welcome, can also signal elevated macroeconomic and 
financial stresses, as was arguably the case in the mid-2000s. Historically large and 
persistent global imbalances deserve careful attention from policymakers, with no 
presumption of innocence. They need not be the benign result of advances in market 
efficiency, as is sometimes claimed. Valuation changes in NIIPs, while possibly 
important in risk allocation, cannot be relied upon systematically to offset the changes in 
national wealth implied by the current account. 
  The same factors that dictate careful attention to global imbalances also imply that 
data on gross international financial flows and positions are central to any assessment of 
financial stability risks. The balance sheet mismatches of leveraged entities provide the 
most direct indicators of potential instability, much more so than global imbalances, 
though the imbalances may well be a symptom that deeper financial threats are gathering. 
Thus, Germany itself experienced neither a current account deficit nor a housing boom in 
the 2000s, yet flows from German banks to economies that did display those symptoms 
led to problems later on. Unfortunately, the ways in which gross financial positions 
propagated the recent global crisis across borders became obvious only after the fact. 
  Recent proposals for international financial and monetary reform seek to limit the 
global proliferation of hazardous gross financial positions and to contain the resulting   40
damage when accidents nonetheless occur. A minimally effective financial “architecture” 
would include further global cooperation in official liquidity facilities, in financial 
regulation, in resolution (of both insolvent banks and sovereign debtors), in the 
informational infrastructure for decision making, and in the fiscal resources needed to 
back up these initiatives. Together, such changes would imply a higher level of global 
economic government than currently exists. The political obstacles are daunting. But in 
light of the recent financial turmoil, one must ask how far we can safely push globalized 
markets beyond the perimeter of globalized governance.   41
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Asia including Japan and newly industrialized Asia Commonwealth of Independent States
Other advanced economies Sub-Saharan Africa
Middle East and North Africa Latin America and the Carribbean
Global discrepancy (sum of balances with sign reversed)
 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook Database, September 2011. Figures for 
2011 and 2012 are IMF staff forecasts. Newly industrialized Asia refers to Hong Kong, Republic of Korea, 
Singapore, and Taiwan.   48
Figure 2: United States Gross Balance of Payments Flows, Financial and 
Current Accounts (Percent of GDP) 
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 Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.  49
Figure 3: Average of Gross Foreign Assets (A) and Liabilities (L) as a Ratio  to 





































Note: BRIC denotes Brazil, Russia, India, and China. NIA denotes Newly Industrialized Asia and consists of 
Honk Kong, Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. UK + ND + SW consists of the United Kingdom, 
Switzerland, and the Netherlands.  
 









































































































Figure 4: Flow and Non-flow Changes in the Net International Investment 
Position: Selected Countries (Percent of GDP) 
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Source: Updated Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) data, provided by the authors.   56
 
Figure  5: Composition of United States Gross External Assets and Liabilities 
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Figure 6: Composition of United Kingdom Gross External Assets and 
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Source: Updated Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) data, provided by the authors.   60
Figure 7: United States International Trasactions in 2008:IV and 2009:I 
(Billions of U.S. Dollars) 
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Figure 8: Cumulated Current Account and Net International Investment 
Position, United States (Percent of GDP) 
 
 































































































Cumulated current account NIIP  62
Figure 9: Cumulated Current Account and Net International Investment 





























































































Cumulated current account NIIP  63
 




























































Cumulated current account NIIP  64






























































Cumulated current acccount NIIP